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Abstract: This paper develops an econometric model of airline entry and price
competition in small airline markets. The paper departs from previous work on
entry in several ways. First, it specifies a structural revenue model that includes
threshold conditions recognizing the discreteness of entry and exit. Second, the
model distinguishes between direct and indirect service decision, and analyzes how
competition in one type of service affects entry and exit in the other. Third, the
paper develops econometric specifications of competition conduct within and across
service segments, taking into account selectivity biases induced by entry. We find
fixed costs do not vary substantially across city-pairs and are on average small.
Direct and indirect travel are not perfect substituted, however, they also are not
independent in demand. Finally, we find evidence that the presence of a direct
firm tends to increase indirect service competition.
This paper was prepared for the FTC/University of Illinois Conference on Empirical
Approaches to Market Power held in Washington, DC. on August 4 and 5. 1988.
Financial support was provided by the Federal Trade Commission, the Fletcher Jones
Foundation, and the Center for Economic Policy Research at Stanford. Fellowship
support was also provided to Reiss by the Olin Foundation and NBER, and to Spiller
by the Institute for Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois,
through its Ameritech Research Fellowship Program. The authors arc grateful to
conference participants and Cliff Winston for helpful comments. We are also
grateful to Nichola Dyer for skillful research assistance.

1. Introduction
Empirical studies of deregulated airline markets have been concerned with two gen-
eral questions. First, did airline deregulation make city-pair markets competitive?
Second, should recent mergers and the rise of hub and spoke systems raise antitrust
concerns? Many recent empirical analyses of airline deregulation have concluded that
city-pair markets are not perfectly contestable. 1 Several studies also conclude that
potential competition is not strong enough to promote price competition." These
conclusions are, with few exceptions, drawn from regressions that find a positive cor-
relation between average market fares and market or airport concentration. 3 While
the observed correlations do raise questions about whether airline markets are per-
fectly contestable, conclusions about potential competition rest on the appropriateness
of price-concentration regressions as a means for assessing market power.
An important limitation of the price-concentration regression framework is that
it does not distinguish between technological and strategic explanations for relations
between fares and market structure. Consider, for example, the finding that airports
with dominant carriers tend to have higher fares. This outcome could reflect the
ability of dominant carriers to erect airport entry barriers, thereby raising the costs of
potential entrants. Alternatively, it could reflect both economies from concentrating
operations at airports and regional efficiency differences among airlines. These two
explanations have very different implications for antitrust policy toward this industry.
In the absence of more complete structural models of entry, however, it is unclear
what existing regression models tell us about strategic pricing behavior.
Recent empirical models of competitive conduct have emphasized that market
concentration and prices are endogenously determined. 4 While some empirical pricing
1 See, for example, Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (1985), Graham, Kaplan, and Sib-
ley (1983), Moore (1986), Morrison and Winston (1987), Peteraf (1987), Borenstein
(1987) and Berry (1988).
2 Graham, Kaplan and Sibley (1983), p. 137.
3 Exceptions include Morrison and Winston (1987) and Berry (1988).
4 For a general discussion of this point see Bresnahan's (1988) survey.
models have recognized this, and have used instrumental variables for concentration
measures, more complete empirical models are needed to justify the variables that
separately identify market concentration and fare equations. Such models would
explain entry in addition to fares. This paper develops a model where direct entry
and fares are simultaneously determined. It is a first step toward understanding how
turnover in city-pair markets affects competition.
Our model departs from previous work on entry in two major ways. First, we
specify a structural pricing model that includes threshold conditions recognizing the
discreteness of entry and exit. In contrast to previous work, this model distinguishes
between direct and indirect service decisions. It clarifies how competition in one type
of service affects entry and exit in the other. It also shows how entry in a differ-
entiated product market introduces a selection bias in equations explaining prices
or quantities. 5 Second, the paper develops an econometric specification that mea-
sures competitive conduct within and across service segments. This specification
takes into account selectivity bias induced by entry. In addition to providing esti-
mates of elasticities and cross-elasticities of direct and indirect service, fixed costs,
and firm conjectures, it makes explicit the economic assumptions needed to estimate
endogenous market structure models. A key feature of the model is its treatment of
unobservable fixed costs. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1987), the magnitude of
fixed costs is determined from information on the number of firms in the market.
While our models have advantages, they also have practical limitations. They
pose significant computational burdens because of the discrete/continuous modelling
of the number of firms and prices. The distinction between direct and indirect service
also introduces additional computational demands. At present, these complications
require us to restrict the generality of our empirical specifications and our data sample.
Like Bresnahan and Reiss (1987), we reduce the complexity of the entry threshold
Direct service is defined as service with no change of planes. It includes nonstop
service as well as service with stops but no change of plane. Indirect service involves
at least one stop with a change of plane.
equations by only using data on small markets. These markets have at most one firm
offering direct service, but can have any number offering indirect service. While the
limitation of the sample to small direct markets simplifies the estimation considerably,
it also introduces a form of sample selection bias. We discuss this problem when
interpreting our results in Section 4.
2. A Model of Direct and Indirect Service
Not all airline service is the same. Passengers can fly first class rather than coach,
leave at peak versus off-peak times, and fly direct instead of indirect. A number of
studies have documented that consumers are willing to pay for these conveniences. In
particular, at the same price, consumers seem to prefer direct over indirect service. 6
Similarly, firms too have preferences over service offerings. In general, indirect flights
have a number of advantages over direct flights. These include greater scheduling
flexibility and fleet utilization. On the other hand, indirect flights tend to be less
profitable because of consumer tastes. We now consider how these tradeoffs affect
fares and firms' decisions to serve routes.
2.1. Service Provision
Firms generally enter markets when their perceived profits are positive. Firms' service
incentives are easily assessed when economic profits are observable. Unfortunately,
both firms' perceptions of profits and economic profits are unobservable. Inferences
about them must be drawn from limited information, such as who provides service
and the level of fares. To model service decisions, assume that firms' decisions are
the discrete outcomes of a simultaneous-move game. Let D be equal to 1 if direct
service is provided and otherwise, and let / be 1 if indirect service is offered and
otherwise. A set of service offerings is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium when
no firm wishes to make a unilateral change in its service. This necessary condition
6 For a study of preferences between single and multiple airline service, see Carlton,
Landes and Posner (1980).
can be expressed as a series of threshold conditions on firms' (unobserved) profits.
These conditions relate unobservable profits to observed qualitative entry decisions.
Denoting firm t's variable profits during a post-entry period by VP,, and fixed costs
by F, . these threshold conditions are:
{D it Ii) = (0,0) *=^ VP?<F,D and VP,7 < F{
(£,,/,) = (0,1) <=> VP? < F,D and VPf > F(
(DiJi) = (1,0) <=> VP,D > Ft
D
and VP,7 < FJ
(Z?i,/,-) = (l,l) <=> VP?>F,D and VP 7 > F 7
(1)
These threshold conditions are similar in appearance to standard discrete choice con-
ditions. As noted in Bresnahan and Reiss (1986), however, they are complicated by
the dependence of each firm's variable profits on the equilibrium actions of firms in
both segments. For example, direct variable profits, VP, , depend on the quantity
strategies of the direct firms and, because consumers view direct and indirect flights
as substitutes, on the quantity strategies of indirect firms. Thus, if there are M firms
that could potentially offer direct service and N that could potentially offer indirect
service, VP? = VP?(tf,
...,gfi,tf,...,rfr).
The dependence of each firm's profits on its own actions and those of other
potential competitors leads to very complicated models of market structure, partic-
ularly in this industry where firms offer differentiated products. This paper takes a
first step toward developing such models by considering how simultaneity affects the
entry and fare decisions in a special case: one where there is at most one firm offering
direct service and N firms offering indirect service. We restrict attention to this case
for two reasons. First, it is empirically tractable. Second, although our analysis is
specialized, it illustrates how potential entrants affect the specification of empirical
models of fares and market structure. Specifically, we shall see how the existence of
a potential entrant in direct service affects the pricing behavior of indirect firms, and
how in turn this behavior affects the likelihood that the direct firm will enter. This
simple empirical model of inter-service competition provides a number of insights
about competition in networks.
We begin by developing the assumptions necessary to recover demand, cost, and
competitive conjecture parameters from observations on whether or not direct service
is offered.
2.2. Demand and Cost Conditions
The demand system for travel on a particular city pair route is assumed to be linear
and symmetric. That is,
PD =aD -bDQ D -cQ [
(2)
P ! =a ! -tiQ 1 -cQ D .
The prices P and P are respectively the prices of a one-way direct and a one-way
indirect trip between the two cities. The quantities Q and Q are the total number
of passengers flying direct and indirect. The demand parameters aD', a 1 ,bD <b! , and c
are positive constants that we are interested in estimating. The common cross-price
term c is used to reduce the computational complexity of the model. Estimates of
c provide some indication of whether consumers view direct and indirect flights as
close substitutes (e.g. 6 = b = c would imply perfect substitutes).
Firms' costs have fixed and variable components. Unit variable costs per pas-
senger are assumed constant. This assumption allows us to subtract marginal costs
from the demand intercepts with little loss in generality. Firms' fixed costs include
all fixed service costs for the route plus any change in network fixed costs. Because
these fixed costs are difficult to measure, even with the best of accounting data, we
treat fixed costs as unobserved random variables.
2.3. The Competitive Environment
Firms' conjectures about rivals' reactions to their decisions figure prominently in the
conditions that determine fares, service levels, and ultimately profits. One problem
with allowing each firm to have a set of conjectures is that this introduces too many
conjectural parameters. Here we adopt a stylized model of competition that is empir-
y tractable and yet retains some of the more important features of cross-service
competition. Our most important simplifying assumption is that firms choose to of-
fei only one type of service. In addition, we examine markets which have at most
one firm offering direct service. No limit is placed on the number of firms offering
indirect service. Indirect firms are, however, assumed to be identical and their num-
ber given. While these are highly stylized assumptions, they do allow us to model
cross-service conjectures in a computationally tractable way. Later we discuss how
these assumptions affect our results.
Following recent work on estimating market power, the extent of competition
between firms is measured using conjectural variation parameters. 7 As there is more
than one type of service, more than one conjectural parameter is required to char-
acterize competition. 8 Some of the more important conjectures are: indirect firm's
perceptions of indirect quantity responses; and direct and indirect firms 1 perceptions
of cross-service quantity responses. Denote an indirect firm's perception of how in-
direct service responds to changes in its service by 8 = dQ /dq
,
the direct firm's
perception of indirect firms' responses to changes in direct service by £
D
= dQ 1/dQD
,
and indirect firms' conjecture by {dQD/dQ I )(dQ I /dq 1 ) = Z ! d. Estimates of £D , £ 7 ,
and 8 provide a sense of how firms compete among themselves and across segments.
Several special cases are of interest. For Cournot-Nash noncooperative competition in
both segements, £ = and 6 = 1. For Bertrand competition in both segments, £ <
and 9 = 0. 9 Other competitive regimes are obtained by allowing these parameters to
differ from and 1. For example, more cooperative outcomes typically have £ >
and0>l.
' See Bresnahan (1988) for a discussion both of econometric models of market
power and the meaning of conjectural variations.
8 For a discussion of multi-product conjectural parameters see Gelfand and Spiller
(1987).
9 Specifically, £* = -c/bD and £ D = -c/b1 .
Estimates of the conjectural parameters can be recovered from the threshold
conditions (1) using information about firms' optimizing behavior. To see this, con-
sider the solution to an oligopoly quantity game played among N symmetric indirect
carriers and one direct competitor. An indirect firm's quantity strategy and price are
j [a<(2b
D + ctD )-ca D }
_
A«'
q (2bD + c( D )[b l(N + 9)^ Sci 1 } - Sc 2 " A
pi Oib
1 +cC I )(a I (2bD + ct D )-caD ) A p/
{2bD + c£ D )[b I(N + 9)-r9c£ I}-Nc 2 A '
The direct firm's output strategy and price are
D
_
a
D (b I(N + 6) + ceZ r )-.\ca I AQD
^ " (2bD + cZ D )[bJ(N + 0) + 9ct l)-Nc 2 A
D (b
D +cZD )(b I(N + $) + c9Z I -Nca I )
_
A pp
{2bD + c^ D )[bJ(y + 9) + 9c£ I}-Nc 2 " A '
Notice that both price and quantity depend on the number of firms offering indirect
service, as well as on demand and conjectural variation parameters. Since we have
data on prices and quantities of direct and indirect service, we could estimate the
demand and conjectural parameters by adding errors and jointly estimating this sys-
tem of equations. Notice, however, that such an approach contains two important
assumptions. First, it assumes that the event "The direct firm has entered'' is given.
Second, and somewhat less important, it assumes that .V is given.
Since direct and indirect airline markets are linked through demand and costs,
the entry of the direct firm introduces a sample selection problem. To understand
this problem, consider the quantity equation for indirect service, equation (3). When
there is no direct firm, equation (3) is inappropriate. Instead, the indirect firm's
quantity strategy switches as follows
(A^'/A ifVP D >FD
i
I /{b I(N + 9)) if VP D < FD
where the second line is indirect quantity when there are no direct competitors. This
equation shows how direct entry affects the specification of indirect price or quantity
8
q
' =
\ a
<' T
equations. It also suggests that indirect entry will create selection effects in direct
price or quantity equations.
Since not all the variables and parameters in profits are observed by us. the shift
in regime in equation (7) raises an unobserved selection bias. Recall that the direct
linn - ers when its variable profits exceed fixed costs, or in logarithms
In AQD + In A PD - 2 In A > In FD . (S)
As demand parameters and fixed costs are unknown, which regime is realized in
equation (7) depends on the distribution of unobserved fixed costs and demand con-
ditions. Since these unobservables are likely correlated across types of service, the
fare equations are subject to an endogenous sample selection problem. (See Heck-
man (1978, 1979) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1986).
)
10 For example, there may be
unobserved demand conditions in a market that simultaneously increase direct and
indirect demand. These unobservables may encourage entry in both markets and
thereby change the relationship between fares and market structure. To understand
the statistical implications of this selection problem, we now develop a more complete
stochastic specification for profits.
2.4. Stochastic Assumptions
Because profits on which firms base entry decisions are not observed, the logarithmic
threshold conditions (8) and (9) must be estimated by treating profits as latent or
unobservable random variables (See Bresnahan and Reiss (1986, 1987)). Conventional
logit and probit approaches to estimating threshold models add a logistic or normally
distributed error to profits. Such an additive error specification can be justified by
10 Endogenous sample selection is involved because there are also entry conditions
for the indirect firms. For example, indirect entry implies
ln(P 7Q ; ) = lnAQ/ +lnA p/ -21nA > InF 1 . (9)
Yet, this condition depends on the direct firm being in the market.
assuming that fixed costs are known up to a multiplicative unobservable random
error, i.e. FC 1 = F] exp(e J ) where j = I or D. The error in fixed costs represents
network or route-specific cost differences that cannot be captured by observables.
These costs include the opportunity cost of allocating a plane to the route and the
fixed costs of having dedicated gate facilities. 11 For simplicity, the natural logarithm
of these costs are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variances
a"D and a J
.
An additive structure on the logarithmic threshold conditions (S) and (9) can
also be justified by assuming that both demand intercepts are estimable up to a
common unobservable, /i, that does not differ across markets. Specifically, we model
the the demand intercepts as a = a
fj. and a = a /z. With nonzero marginal costs,
our assumption is that the difference between the demand intercept and marginal
cost is multiplied by the common unobservable /i. 12 To make the econometric model
tractable and to keep prices positive at small levels of service, it is assumed that /i
is lognormally distributed, or equivalently that 21n(/i) is normally distributed with
mean zero and variance a 2 .
The joint distribution of the unobservables zz, eD
,
and t 1 determines the prob-
ability of entry. Substituting the fixed cost and demand errors into the threshold
conditions (8) and (9), service is offered when
\n(PDQ D ) >lnFD + eD (10)
and
ln(PIQI)>\nFI + €I (11)
11 Fixed costs are likely to include the costs of maintaining a gate, overhead service
personnel, and prorated costs of the plane. Currently, the cost of renting a Boeing 757
passenger airliner for a day are in the neighborhood of $15,000. (See San Francisco
Chronicle, Section C, Monday, June 27, 1988.)
12
If the unobservable demand effects differed between indirect and direct service,
then the additively separable structure of the error term would no longer be preserved.
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The probability that the direct firm enters conditional on there being N indirect firms
is
Pr(D = l|Ar > 1) = $[(lnAQD + lnAPD + 21n(/i) - 2 In A - ln(FD ))/<7D ] (12)
where $(•) is the cumulative normal distribution function. Conditional on entry, we
observe the direct firm's total revenue, P DQ D . Observed and predicted total direct
revenue are related by the equation
\n(PDQD ) = In AQD + In A PD + 21n(/i) - 2 In A.
Whether or not the direct firm enters, we observe total indirect revenue for all firms
on the route. That is, we observe P 1 Q 1 = Nq 1P 1 .
To derive the likelihood function for whether or not there is direct service given
that there are .V indirect firms, we relate the stochastic structure of the observables
to the two events. For markets with direct service
e
D <\nPDQ D -\nFD
and
2 In aii = (In PDQD + lnP ;Q ; - In AQD - In APD - In AQ/ - In A p/ + 4 In A)/2.
Assuming that eD and ln/i are independently distributed, the likelihood contribution
of a market with direct service is
^(21n/ii/o-M)Pr(D = 1|JV > 1) (13)
where <j> is the standard normal density and Pr(D = 1\N > 1) is defined in (12). For
markets without direct service we know
e
D >lnPDQD -\nFD
11
and
21n^ 2 ^InP'Q 1 -lnAg/ -lnA p/ + 21nA.
The likelihood contribution of a market with no direct service is
o(2ln fi 2 /a,)Pr{D = 0\N> 1) (14)
where Pr( D = Q\N > 1) = 1 - Pr(D = l\N > 1).
The likelihood function consisting of regimes (13) and (14) has a form that is
similar to censored regression models with unobservable stochastic thresholds. (See
for example Maddala (1983).) In these models, the assumption that the threshold
(eD ) error and the censored error (ln/i) are independent is necessary for identification
of the parameters. The demand and conjectural parameters of our model are esti-
mated by maximum likelihood using this normalization. An important assumption
underlying our likelihood function is that it is conditional on N, the number of indi-
rect firms. This assumption constrains the equilibrium conditions in (1), since it does
not allow the number of indirect firms to vary with the number of direct firms. While
in principle more general models are desirable, we have been unable to formulate an
empirically tractable version of such a model. The main difficulty is that the likeli-
hood function for the number of entrants is not be well-defined unless unobservable
payoffs satisfy certain economic restrictions that make the entry outcomes unique.
(See Bresnahan and Reiss (1986).) In our model with entry in two types of service
and continuous observables, these conditions are quite complicated.
3. The Data and Empirical Specifications
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Department of Transportation's
Origin and Destination Survey, Data Bank IA. 13 These data cover domestic carrier
operations on U.S. routes during the first quarter of 1982. They are based on a 10
13 These data are based on Boeing Computer Services processed version of the
original Origin and Destination Survey.
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percent sample of all purchased tickets. The data include the average number of
' :
.' iwn daily between an origin and destination, and average fares for direct
and in ct routings.
Thi : uses two different samples, one with 113 observations and a second
with an additional 687 observations. Both samples were selected using the same
criteria. From an alphabetical list of city-pairs, routes were chosen whenever they:
had no more than one direct firm, had indirect service, and had price and quantity
information available for all firms. To make routes comparable, we excluded routes
with Hawaiian or Alaskan cities. The smaller sample of 113 markets is based on
a screening of the first 200 markets. It was used extensively to develop our initial
specifications. The larger sample is based upon a screening of the top 2500 city-pair
markets in 19S2 to obtain a sample of S00. Because the computational demands of
our model increase dramatically with the sample size, this larger sample was used
primarily as a hold-out sample on which we could check the findings from the smaller
sample.
While dealing with small direct markets simplifies the estimation process con-
siderably, this selection criterion non-randomly censors the sample. This censoring
operates in two ways. First, it affects the probability model for entry based on the
threshold conditions (1). In particular, holding the observables fixed, we truncate
outcomes where the unobservables would support two direct firms. This sample se-
lection problem is likely to bias estimates of fixed costs, since they are important
determinants of the threshold conditions. It may also bias estimates of the demand
parameters. One way to oversome this censoring bias is to model entry of the second,
third, and subsequent direct firms. This model is beyond the scope of this paper and
is left for further work. A second potential truncation problem is that we do not have
many observations where there is only direct service. Thus, we are unable to model
similar initial selection problems caused by the entry of indirect firms. In future work
we also hope to treat the entry decisions of indirect entrants.
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3.1. The Demand Specification
Previous studies of airline demand (e.g. Brown and Watkins (1963). Abrahams
(1980), and Ippolito (1981)) have found that a variety of demographic variables are
useful in explaining total market demand for service. Few studies have, however,
separated total market demand into its direct and indirect service components. Our
demand specifications include variables used in previous demand studies, as well as
variables that help explain the relative demands for direct versus indirect service.
The demand intercepts are assumed to be of the form 14
a } = exp(a J + a[ * MINPOP + a\ * ATEMP + a ;3 * XDIST).
The own slope parameters are assumed constant, and the cross-effect specification is
c = exp(c + C! * DISTDIFF + c2 * ATEMP).
In these equations, j represents direct or indirect, MINPOP is the minimum popu-
lation of the two cities, ATEMP is the absolute value of the difference in the cities'
average January temperature (divided by 100), XDIST is a variable equal to 1 if
the distance between the two cities is more than 1,000 miles, and 100'DISTDIFF is
the difference between DISTLH, the shortest Great Circle routing between the origin
and destination cities that passes over a large hub, and DISTANCE, the Great Circle
distance between the origin and destination.
The variable MINPOP measures the size of the market. Previous studies have
used alternative measures, such as the sum or product of both cities' populations. Our
use of MINPOP is motivated by the following example. There is much more travel
between San Francisco and New York City than there is between San Francisco and
Champaign, Illinois. Further, relative to their total populations, there is not much
of a difference in travel between Champaign and San Francisco, and Champaign
14 These exponential forms assure that the parameters are positive as required by
the theory.
14
and New York. In trying to predict travel demands for each of these pairings, it
seems that if is the people of Champaign and their propensity to travel (or have
visitors) that largely determines the size of the market. Indeed, when compared to the
other measures mentioned above, MINPOP was always economically and statistically
more significant. Of course, population is not the only determinant of demand. The
variable ATEMP is used as an indicator of potential tourist demand for wanner
(and sometimes colder climates). We expect that demand is greater the larger the
difference in climates, and that a 2 > a® because vacationers are more willing to
change planes. The variable XDIST is included to take into account the availability
of substitute modes of transport. We expect that the longer the distance between
cities, the greater is consumers' willingness to pay for plane trips.
The cross-price parameter c depends on both city characteristics and routing
considerations. The variable DISTDIFF measures the extra miles that a passenger
has to travel to go through a large hub. Since most indirect flights connect through a
large hub, the time cost of an indirect flight is increasing in DISTDIFF. Large values
of DISTDIFF should therefore make indirect and direct flights less close substitutes.
That is, C\ should be negative. The degree of substitutability between the two types
of service should also depend on whether the route is a tourist route. We include
ATEMP, as above, to proxy the amount of tourist travel. Because tourists are more
likely to view the two services as close substitutes, we expect c 2 > 0.
3.2. The Fixed Costs Specification
Fixed costs are difficult to measure directly. As an alternative, we parameterize fixed
costs as a linear function of observables. These variables capture some of the route
and network-related fixed costs affecting entry. The remainder are part of the fixed
cost error. We use the following specification for the non-random component of fixed
costs of direct service
FD = exp(F + F] * CONGEST + F2 * LARGEHUB + F3 * DISTANCE).
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The variable CONGEST is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the congested cities Los
Angeles, Chicago, Washington and New York. These cities have been singled out
in previous work as being congested during this time period. 10 Terminal and fixed
maintenance costs are known to be substantially higher in these cities, as are the
opportunity costs of slots. The variable LARGEHUB is included to measure the
relative increase or decrease in fixed costs from operating out of a major airport.
This variable is equal to one if at least one of the airports meets the Department of
Transportation's definition of a large hub. lb We expect that F\ should be greater
than zero. The sign of F2 is ambiguous a priori. Finally, DISTANCE is included to
allow for the possibility that entry may be more costly the longer the direct flight.
In essence, DISTANCE measures any disadvantages that a regional airline faces in
spreading its operations. This disadvantage could reflect either increased operation
or equipment costs from geographical dispersion.
4. Results
Table 1 reports sample averages of the variables in our data set for markets with
and without direct service. Roughly seventy percent of the markets in both samples
have a direct firm. These markets are on average twice as large as markets without
a direct firm and they have slightly fewer firms overall. Markets with only indirect
service tend to be longer haul markets and they are less likely to have a large hub
as an endpoint. Markets with direct service have average market fares in the range
of 20 to 25 cents per mile. These yields (i.e. fare per mile) are roughly comparable
to those reported in other studies (e.g. Bailey and Panzar (1981) and Borenstein
(1988)). Not too much can be made of the lower average fares in the indirect-only
markets, since yields are known to decline with distance. 17 According to our tourism
index ATEMP, the markets without direct service are more likely to carry tourist
15 For example, Bailey, Grahan, and Kaplan (1985).
16 See for example the Department of Transportation's Airport Activity Statistics.
17 See for example Bailey, Grahan, and Kaplan (1985).
16
traffic. Finally, there is little difference between the markets in terms of our market
size measure MINPOP.
Table 2 reports two sets of estimates of the direct service model based on the
smaller sample. Both specifications allow indirect firms to have arbitrary conjectures
about indirect competition (i.e. 8 is estimated). The specifications differ by whether
cross-service competition is assumed to be Cournot (i.e. £ D = £' = 0) or Bertrand.
18
We limited our attention to these two regimes because of the difficulty in maximizing
the likelihood function when the conjectures were unconstrained. The estimates of
the demand parameters are roughly similar across the two specifications. The effect of
various variables can be evaluated using values of the exogenous variables. Estimates
of the market demand parameters are summarized in Table 8. These estimates are for
the average market in our sample. The slope coefficients indicate that direct demand
is more steeply sloped than indirect demand. If direct and indirect service were
perfect substitutes, then we would expect b 1 = bD = c . At the sample means, we can
reject this hypothesis for the direct coefficient, but not for the indirect coefficient.
As expected, increasing the distance required to fly through a large hub reduces the
degree of substitutability c. Routes that have more tourists, according to ATEMP,
appear to encourage less substitution between direct and indirect service.
Of the individual intercept coefficients, minimum population has a positive effect
on both demands and is statistically significant. 19 Holding prices constant, at the
sample means a doubling of the minimum population will increase direct demand by
2.5 percent and indirect demand by over 30 percent. The tourism index ATEMP has
the correct sign for indirect but appears to reduce direct demand. It is, however, gen-
erally insignificant. The long distance dummy XDIST is only marginally significant
in indirect, indicating that demand does not increase significantly with distance.
18 See footnote 9 for the Bertrand conditions.
19
It is worth repeating that the intercept estimates in the table are the demand
intercepts minus marginal cost. The comparative statics on the demand parameters
assume that marginal costs do not depend on demand variables.
17
Among the variables used to explain fixed costs, only DISTAN'CE of the flight is
significant. Although the effect of DISTAN'CE is statistically significant, it does not
have a large economic effect. For example, increasing the distance of the flight from
1000 to 1500 miles adds approximately $ 50 - $ 75 to fixed costs. Both congested
airports and large hubs have higher fixed costs. 20 The fixed cost estimates from both
models are similar but seem unusually low. The expected (daily) fixed costs for direct
service for a non-hub, uncongested city pair located 1000 miles apart are respectively
$ 146 and $ 169 for the Cournot and Bertrand models. For congested large hubs
these figures are $242 and $266. Finally, the variance of the fixed cost unobservables
is relatively modest. For the calculations above, the standard deviation of fixed costs
is roughly between $ 100 and $ 150.
The two models provide slightly different estimates of the indirect solution con-
cept 9. The cross-market Cournot estimate in the first column indicates 9 is slightly
above, but not significantly different from, the indirect Cournot value of 1. The
Bertrand specification estimate is close to the symmetric perfect cartel value N. 21
Since the other estimated parameters are roughly comparable, there is little reason
to prefer one specification over another except on the basis of overall fit. Comparing
the two models using the Akaike Information Criterion suggests that the Bertrand
model is the preferred model. 22
Tables 3 and 4 report restricted versions of the model estimated in Table 2. Both
tables again use the smaller sample of markets. Table 3 reports Cournot and Bertrand
20 See Spiller (1988) for an efficiency explanation of this finding based on capacity
constraints at large hubs. Borenstein (1988) provides a noncompetitive explanation
for this finding.
21 The point estimate of 2.1 is close to the 2.4 average number of indirect suppliers.
It should be noted, however, that if market shares are not identical then 9 can exceed
N when firms perfectly collude. We thank Margaret Slade for pointing this out.
22 The AIC is given by ln( likelihood) - A', where A' is the number of parameters.
See Akaike (1973). Since the two specifications have the same number of parameters
and observations, the criterion suggests choosing the model with the higher likelihood
value.
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cross-service models under the assumption that there is a perfect cartel in the indirect
market. That is, N = 1 and consequently 0=1. Table 4 assumes that the .V indirect
firms offering indirect maintain Cournot conjectures. The parameter estimates in
these two tables do not differ substantially from those in Table 2. It appears therefore
that the demand and cost parameter estimates are relatively insensitive to the within
indirect service conjecture 9. Perhaps the most important difference between Tables 3
and 4 is the smaller slope coefficient estimates obtained for the Bertrand assumption
in Table 3. These estimates suggest that for the average market in our sample, direct
and indirect flights are not perfect substitutes. There is, however, still substantial
substitution. Another difference is that the likelihood values in Table 3 suggest that
the Cournot model of cross-service competition is to be preferred to the Bertrand
model.
Table 5 explores the robustness of our results to the size of the sample. It reports
estimates of the Table 3 perfect cartel specification based on the larger sample of 800
markets. Comparing the Cournot estimates in the first column of Tables 3 and 5
we find that there are a few differences in the estimates. Tourism appears to be a
less important determinant of demand for the larger sample. Estimated fixed costs
are roughly the same, although the estimated standard deviation of unobserved fixed
costs is higher in the larger sample. The most important differences between Table 3
and 5 are in the Bertrand models. In particular, in the larger sample, estimated fixed
costs are substantial. For an uncongested, non-large hub route the estimated fixed
costs are $13,302, as compared to $108 for the Cournot model. These fixed costs are
more in line with the rental cost of a plane. 23
The differences between the Cournot and Bertrand models is Table 5 may reflect
real differences in the way direct and indirect and direct firms react to each other.
Alternatively, they may reflect changes in the indirect firms' conjectures about each
others
1 behavior (9) based on the presence or absence of the direct firm. Table 6
23 See footnote 11.
19
explores this latter possibility. Table 6 presents estimates of a model that allows
to vary by whether or not there is direct service. Conjectures are 9q when there
is direct service and 9\ when there is no indirect service. The point estimates of
the 9's in Table 6 differ slightly across the Cournot and Bertrand specifications.
Conjectures are uniformly lower when there is direct service, with the estimated 9$
being insignificantly different from the noncooperative Cournot value of 1. When
there is no direct service, the indirect firms appear to behave more cooperatively,
with the estimated conjecture being close to the value implied by a svmmetric cartel,
namely the average number of indirect firms.
Table 7 examines the hypothesis that in the absence of direct service the indirect
firms perfectly collude. We test this hypothesis by assuming #!=N=1. That is, 9 X is
set equal to the number of indirect firms when there is no direct service. WTe let N
take its actual value when there is direct service. Both models in Table 7 give similar
parameter estimates. The Cournot model, however, has an estimated 9q less than
that estimated under Bertrand cross-service conjectures. The Akaike Information
Criteria for these models and their counterparts from the previous table are very
similar, suggesting that the cartel assumption introduced in Table 7 is not rejected.
To summarize the results in Tables 2 through 7, most of the demand and cost
parameters are relatively stable across the different specifications. First, the demand
for direct service is usually estimated to be less elastic than that of indirect. The
direct service slope estimates are very large if it is assumed that the marginal costs
of service are zero. Evidence in Table 5, however, indicates that this conclusion is
sensitive to the sample size. There is also some evidence that the demand estimates
are sensitive to the functional form of the model. For a single direct firm with zero
marginal costs, the equilibrium direct demand elasticity must be 1. Our estimates
based upon sample average prices and quantities generally imply a demand elasticity
lower than 1. If, however, demand elasticities are calculated using predicted quantities
and prices, the predicted demand elasticity is one. One possible explanation for this
20
phenomenon is selectivity bias in the sample. That is, direct firms may enter only
when they have a higher than average demand shock (i.e. large h\fi). At a given
quantity, observed prices will therefore tend to be higher than those predicted for the
average market in our sample.
A second consistent finding in the tables is that observable fixed costs are small
and there is little apparent variation in unobserved fixed costs. The estimates of the
Bertrand model in Table 5, however, suggest that this finding may be sensitive to the
sample of markets and the conjectures made by direct and indirect firms. Some of
the variables used to proxy fixed costs have effects that are consistent with several
recent empirical studies. In particular, for the large sample, direct service from large
hubs has higher fixed costs than from smaller hubs. This may explain in part recent
efforts by airlines to develop hubs in smaller uncongested airports (e.g. Piedmont's
development of the Charlotte, Dayton, and Syracuse hubs). Whether this is because
of gate and capacity constraints, or because of some inherent disadvantage of smaller
carriers, cannot be answered here.
5. Conclusions
Many empirical studies of airline prices draw conclusions about market power from
regressions of fares on market structure variables. These studies document relations
between fares and concentration measures. They do not, however, distinguish between
market power and technological determinants of fares. Such distinctions require more
complete models of airline service. The model in this paper takes a step in this
direction by modelling consumer demand for direct and indirect service. It also
emphasizes that statements about price competition require models of entry. For
example, statements that firms have long-run market power imply that potential
competition and entry are ineffective. There are a variety of reasons why entry could
be ineffective, such as high entry barriers. To disentangle entry barriers from normal
cost differences, a model of entry in the presence of fixed entry costs is required. Such
21
a model must explain how strategic behavior affects entry.
The stylized model in this paper indicates that this task is difficult, as entry
introduces a selectivity bias in equations explaining fares or quantities. This prob-
lem arises because the observable and unobservable variables determining entry are
related to unobservables affecting demand and costs. Interdependences in firms' en-
try and price or quantity decisions also create selection problems. Our model begins
to analyze these selection problems by considering how direct entry affects indirect
revenues and competition. Our estimates of demand, cost and competitive parame-
ters yield several findings worth future study. Fixed costs do not vary substantially
across city-pairs and they are not very large. The estimated standard deviation of
unobserved fixed costs is also small, suggesting that that unobserved fixed costs (e.g.
airport specific costs) are likely small. Direct and indirect travel are not perfect sub-
stitutes, nor, however, are they independent in demand. Finally, our specifications
of competitive conjectures do not provide definitive evidence that cross- service con-
jectures are perfectly competitive or perfectly collusive. We do find, however, that
the presence of a direct firm does tend to increase competition within the indirect
segment.
Our model and findings begin the process of understanding the richness of air-
lines' products and the ways in which airlines compete. As discussed above, much
remains to be done to improve our models and understanding of the data. For ex-
ample, several important specification problems in our model remain. First, we need
to model the endogeneity of the number of indirect firms. Second, the model needs
to be extended to allow all firms to endogenously choose whether to serve one or
both segments. Finally, and perhaps most important, the model and the data need
to be extended to allow more than one direct firm. Progress on each of these topics
should prove important in understanding how to measure market power not only in
this industry, but also in other concentrated, differentiated product markets.
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TABLE 1
SAMPLE AVERAGES
N =113 N = 800
Direct No Direct Direct No Direct
Variable Service Service Service Service
Total Passengers (Daily) 39.1 14.4 35.6 17.7
Direct Passengers (Daily) 24.8 N.A. 19.5 N.A.
Total Number Of Firms 2.14 2.94 2.55 2.64
Fare Per Mile (In Cents) 23.45 13.67 21.24 15.01
DISTANCE (In Miles) 719 1333 898 1342
DISTDIFF 99.8 7.6 61.5 23.0
Large Hub (In Percent) 70 54 72 71
MINPOP (In Millions) .56 .64 .66 .64
ATEMP 12.7 18.8 15.5 18.6
Markets 78 35 509 291
TABLE 2
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD MODEL
OLIGOPOLY IN INDIRECT
Estimation of 9
lo
a
VARIABLE
CONSTANT
MINPOP
ATEMP
XDIST
CONSTANT
MINPOP
ATEMP2
a{ XDIST
bD
b1
c CONSTANT
c, DISTDIFF
c 2 ATEMP
FD CONSTANT
F° CONGEST
Ff LARGEHUB
F3D DISTANCE
a
Log Likelihood
N
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.
Cournot Bertrand
Cross-Service Cross-Service
Competition Competition
5.88 6.36
(12.82) (13.67)
.32 .33
(2.87) (3.21)
-.82 -.59
(-.91) (-68)
.05 .09
(.45) (1.05)
5.68 5.86
(12.60) (12.02)
.23 .29
(2.08) (2.47)
.27 .28
(.66) (.74)
.22 .19
(1.96) (1.79)
4.38 4.45
(5.03) (4.57)
2.34 2.79
(2.72) (2.79)
2.03 2.90
(2.82) (4.12)
-.79 -.26
(-1.97) (-1.60)
-1.18 -.81
(-.46) (-76)
4.21 4.46
(10.44) (11.37)
.44 .34
(1.12) (.95)
.07 .11
(.34) (.63)
.72D-3 .62D-3
(3.44) (3-24)
1.46 2.12
(3.82) (3.24)
.32 .26
(2.68) (2.98)
.72 .73
(11.49) (11.70)
-143.52 -1 10.81
113 113
TABLE 3
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD MODEL
PERFECT CARTEL IN INDIRECT
VARIABLE
CONSTANT
a? M IN POP
a? ATEMP
^ XDIST
«£ CONSTANT
*i MINPOP
«,' ATEMP
4 XDIST
bD
b 1
Co CONSTANT
C\ DISTDIFF
c 2 ATEMP
Fo° CONSTANT
F? CONGEST
pD LARGEHUB
FD DISTANCE
a
Log Likelihood
N
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.
Cournot Bertrand
Cross-Service Cross-Service
Competition Competition
6.06 5.66
(13.99) (9.38)
.31 .33
(3.03) (3.48)
-2.16
-.52
(-2.15) (-68)
.07 .09
(-39) (1.12)
5.40 5.34
(12.57) (12.37)
.28 .28
(2.65) (2.84)
.16 .30
(.39) (.74)
.14 .16
(1.29) (1.80)
2.99 2.81
(3.37) (3.07)
1.83 1.77
(2.04) (2.84)
3.13 1.71
(5.18) (2.84)
-.19 -.19
(-1.06) (-.68)
-3.96 -.66
(-2.51) (-84)
4.69 4.54
(11.09) (7.01)
.40 .37
(1.02) (.50)
.04 .09
(.18) (.50)
.57D-3 .66D-3
(2.37) (2.85)
.28 .27
(2.58) (3.03)
.72 .74.
(11.63) (12.99)
-140.53 -142.33
113 113
TABLE 4
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD MODEL
COURNOT IN INDIRECT
(9= 1)
\ARIABLE
«§ CONSTANT
«? MINPOP
a? ATEMP
a 3
° XDIST
a'o CONSTANT
a[ MINPOP
4 ATEMP
4 XDIST
bD
b 1
Co CONSTANT
C\ DISTDIFF
C2 ATEMP
Fo
D CONSTANT
Ff CONGEST
Ff LARGEHUB
F? DISTANCE
a
Log Likelihood
N
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.
Cournot Bertrand
Cross-Service Cross-Service
Competition Competition
5.90 6.31
(14.72) (13.44)
.31 .30
(2.81) (2.90)
-.55 -.52
(-.77) (-69)
.10 .13
(.98) (1.48)
6.07 6.02
(13.70) (14.69)
.20 .24
(1.76) (1.82)
.22 .24
(2.56) (2.63)
.24 .25
(2.56) (2.63)
4.42 4.61
(5.21) (5.51)
2.95 2.87
(3.63) (3.61)
2.32 2.77
(4.79) (4.48)
-.67 -.36
(-1.97) (-1.47)
-.56 -.75
(-.37) (-.71)
4.13 4.28
(12.95) (11.55)
.33 .25
(.93) (.66)
.14 .16
(.78) (.86)
.70D-3 .62D-3
(3.20) (2.83)
.29 .26
(6.81) (3.20)
.74 .75
(13.35) (12.54)
-144.07 143.22
113 113
T \ r r V *»
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD MODEL
PERFEC1 CARTEL IN INDIRECT
(9 = l t N = 11
VARIABLE
Cournot
Cross-Service
Bertrand
Cross-Service
Competition Competition
"S CONSTANT 6.09 6.5.5
«f M IN POP
(18.92)
.36
(24.56)
.18
•f ATEMP
(11.02)
-.98
(5.52)
-.28
°? XDIST
(-I.00)
.08
(-1.57)
.04
•4 CONSTANT
(2.08)
5.26
(1.12)
5.49
«,' MINPOP
(16.21)
.36
(14.58)
.22
«2 ATEMP
(10.18)
.06
(7.02)
-.22
-3' XDIST
(.41)
.07
(-1.15)
.04
t D
(1.77) (1.26)
6^
3.14 1.55
,/
(4.88) (2.36)
6'
1.26 1.30
CO CONSTANT
(1.92)
2.72
(1.73)
.88
Cl DISTDIFF
(28.02)
-.03
(4.15)
-.00
c 2 ATEMP
(-1.36)
-1.16
(-2.01)
.38D-2
^o
D CONSTANT
(-1.66)
3.78
(•13)
8.73
Ff CONGEST
(26.84)
-.04
(18.87)
.18
FD LARGEHUB
(-.29)
.22
(1.52)
.23
pD DISTANCE
(2.46)
.86D-3
(2.88)
.72D-3
0"D
(8.97)
.63
(9.42)
.51
(9.77) (10.06)
<7
.85
.89
Log Likelihood
(31.29)
-1287.97
(29.42)
-1278.22
N 800 800
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.
TABLE 6
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD MODEL
OLIGOPOLY IN INDIRECT WITH REGIME CHANGE
Estimation of Og and 9\
VARIABLE
«o
D CONSTANT
a? MINPOP
a? ATEMP
«3
D XDIST
«{ CONSTANT
«.' MINPOP
n{ ATEMP
a i XDIST
bD
b1
CO CONSTANT
Cl DISTDIFF
C2 ATEMP
tf CONSTANT
Ff CONGEST
f? LARGEHUB
tf DISTANCE
00
Ox
°D
N
Log Likelihood
Cournot Bertrand
Cross-Service Cross-Service
Competition Competition
6.32 6.12
(13.74) 13.93)
.34 .36
(3.26) (3.40)
-.94 -.74
(-1.65) (-98)
.11 .10
(1.01) 1.09)
5.93 5.59
(12.83) (13.21)
.28 .33
(2.47) (2.85)
.34 .30
(.88) (-0)
.20 .14
(1.99) (1.37)
4.68 3.50
(4.98) (4.00)
2.98 2.21
(3.362) (2.437)
2.81 2.37
(4.46) (3.88)
-.70 -.17
(-1.70) (-1.39)
-1.57 -.94
(-1.20) 1-1.17)
4.58 4.55
(8.41) (10.61)
.43 .44
(1.18) (1.23)
.02 .00
(.12) (.02)
.92D-3 .86D-3
(3.61) (3.09)
.53 1.18
(1.26) (2.22)
2.58 4.26
(2.49) (1.87)
.29 .25
(3.45) (2.81)
.72 .72
(12.23) (11.91)
-141.78 139.01
113 113
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.
TABLE 7
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD MODEL
OLIGOPOLY IN INDIRECT
9
X
= N = 1 and #o Estimated
VARIABLE
«o° CONSTANT
a? M IN POP
a? ATEMP
a? XDIST
4 CONSTANT
»' MINPOP
a^ ATEMP
J XDIST
6D
&'
CO CONSTANT
Cl DISTDIFF
C2 ATEMP
^o° CONSTANT
Ff CONGEST
FD LARGEHUB
pD DISTANCE
°D
Log Likelihood
N
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.
Cournot Bertrand
Cross-Service Cross-Service
Competition Competition
6.01 6.10
(11.86) (12.87)
.34 .34
(3.10) (3.20)
-.84 -.81
(-78) (-1.22)
.12 .11
(1.18) (1.21)
5.76 5.70
(12.60) (13.12)
.25 .26
(2.27) (2.40)
.34 .29
(.87) (.73)
.19 .18
(1.80) (1.67)
3.98 3.76
(4.39) (4.49)
2.67 2.59
(3.10) (3.01)
2.41 2.51
(3.20) (4.13)
-.67 -.28
(-1.58) (-1.23)
-1.31 -1.14
(-.48) (-1.23)
4.62 4.54
(7.35) (10.90)
.43 .37
(1.22) (1.02)
.01 .04
(.05) (.24)
.94D-3 .81D-3
(3.84) (3.40)
.53 1.12
(1.29) (2.29)
.28 .25
(2.97) (2.68)
.73 .73
(11.65) (11.82)
-141.88 -140.04
113 113
TABLE 8
ESTIMATES OF THE DEMAND PARAMETERS
EVALUATED AT SAMPLE AVERAGES
Cournot
Cross- Service
Competition Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7
a
D 395.4 394.8 425.2 501.0 624.2 464.7
a
1 383.0 286.6 556.5 259.3 506.4 420.9
c 4.6 12.0 6.9 11.5 9.7 6.7
bD 80.3 19.8 82.7 23.0 107.6 53.4
b l 10.4 6.3 19.1 3.5 19.7 14.4
Bertrand
Cross-Service
Competition Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7
a
D 674.9 338.7 664.7 772.6 528.0 607.3
a
1 470.8 275.0 532.9 275.7 364.1 393.0
c 13.8 4.5 11.7 2.4 8.4 8.8
bD 85.3 16.6 100.4 4.7 33.0 43.0
b 1 16.3 5.9 17.6 3.7 9.1 12.2
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